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IN 'I'!!E SUPHL11E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
pJiUCI! f!OIH::S, INC. , 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GREW'J::f'. PARl< CI'l'Y CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15467 
This is an action for damages for breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial, the court entered judgment in favor of 
plaintiff for the sum of $42,587, with interest.thereon from 
J.lay 1, 1975, in the amount of $6,196.12, for a total judg-
ment of $48,783.12, plus plaintiff's costs of $655.30. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Ranch Homes, Inc., seeks affirmance of the 
judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ranch Homes, Inc., is a closely held Utah corporation 
formcd in the summer of 1974 by James D. Fahs, Jr., G. Michael 
Tuckett and Grant s. Kesler. Prior to their association in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Ranch Homes, Fahs h0d Lxeen emnloyed by appcJ L:mt Cr t 
• - - , - ea er 
Park City Company ("CPCC"), designing condominiums, doing 
subdivision la••outs, manaqing construction, and ; ~ preparing 
feasibility studies for housin9 in the Park City area 
(R 590); Tuckett had been a GPCC project engineer (R 67 4); 
and Kesler l1i1d bc:c:n in private: law practice in Salt Lake 
City. 
Robert H. Wells was employed by GPCC from 1971 througl, , 
1975, and was its executive vice-president for the last 
three of those years (R 746). lis early as December, 1973, 
while both Fahs and \·Jells were with GPCC, the two traveled 
to California together (R 591), and during that trip Fahs 
discussed with Wells the fact that he and his associates 
wanted to develop a residential subdivision in Park City 
that would be primarily composed of approximcttely 103 to lOj 
lots on a 30-acre parcel of property. At that time Fahs 
told Wells that he believed there was a tremendous market 
for an FHA-approved type of subdivision with FHA insured 
loans. 
During the next 5 to 6 months rahs and Wc:lls carried on 
negotiations, discussing at various times 1·1hat Fahs and his 
associates were proposing (R 592). September 3, 19 7 4, afte: 
Fahs and Tuckett had left GPCC and had formed Ranch Hornes, 
the two compil.nies entered into a contract, titlccl "Option 
Agreement" (Exhibit 2) under the tc;:rm.s of v'11 i c!i 1<;111ch Homes 
- 2 -
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paid GPCC $10,000 for an option to purchase approximately 30 
acres in the Holiday Ranch area, adjacent to GPCC's own 
planned development of housing, equestrian trails, a golf 
course, a tennis center and other improvements (R 594, 
Exhibit 3) · 
The contract was not a typical option. It consisted of 
16 pages of terms and conditions, many of them relating 
specifically to the development planned by Ranch Homes. 
In addition to describing the property, establishing 
the purchase price, and providing the date and method for 
exercise of the option, the contract permitted Ranch Homes 
to receive conveyances of 10-acre parcels of property upon 
the payment by Ranch Homes of the per acre price (Ex. ~ •6). 
It provided that the property would be utilized as the site 
for the development, construction and utilization of no more 
than one hundred and five single-family residential home 
sites and homes, and that for a period of twenty years, 
none of the option property could be utilized for any other 
purpose without GPCC's prior written consent (Ex. 2, •lO). 
Ranch Hornes and parties purchasing from it were not to 
construct any improvements, buildings or structures upon the 
option property without GPCC having first approved the 
detailed plans and specifications, and it was acknowledged 
and agreed by Ranch Homes that all decisions as to the 
acceptabil .i ty or approval of such plans and specifications 
- 3 -
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"""' 
would be in GPCC's sole and Ullrcslrictcd discretion. In 
order to obtain such approval, nanch Hornes or the Purtio~ 
purchasing from it 1·wre to fjubrnit copies of propo:jed Plans 
and specifications, and if GPCC did not approve the Plan ·, 
, 11. 
was to indicate the portions that it didn't approve, whe~-
upon revised plans might be submi ttE:,d. 
Ranch llomes also agreed that the improvements, buildins 
or structures would be construe tcd in accordance with the 
plans and specifications approved by CPCC and that complete.: 
streets and utility installations would be subject to accep· 
tance by GPCC as being constructed in accordanccc with said 
approved plan and specifications (Ex. 2, ~ 11). 
Ranch Hornes and its authorized representatives were to 
have the right, prior to the exercise of the option, to 
enter upon the property for the purpose of examining and 
investigating it, though it was not to alter the surface cl 
the property until it had exercised the option (Ex. 2, Ii 
12). 
GPCC acknowledg2d its intention to construct an 18-hole 
golf course in the area and agreed that a designated area 
would not be used for any other purpose for a period of ten 
years (Ex. 2, ~ 19). 
GPCC agreed that if the option were exercised it would 
install or cause to be installed an eight-inch water line 
and an eight-inch se-. .. 'er line extending from tlic trunk line 
- 4 -
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to the watc1 and sewer system of Park City Municipal Corpora-
tion; unclen_p:ound electrical lines; a paved roadway to the 
boundary of the option property; and a drainage system. 
construction of the road and utilities, a major undertaking, 
would have cost about $500,000 (R 774), and GPCC agreed that 
in event of exercise of the option it would provide assur-
ance in a form satisfactory to Ranch's construction lender 
that its obligation to install the utilities and roadway 
would be fulfilled (Ex. 2, 11 20). 
Ranch Homes agreed that it would discharge all liabili-
ties arising out of activities upon or in connection with 
the option property prior to the conveyance dates (Ex. 2, ' 
24), and that in the event of construction prior to the 
conveyance dates it would furnish a payment bond to GPCC 
(Ex. 2, II 25). Ranch Homes was to provide insurance, was to 
comply with all federal, state and local laws, regulations, 
rules and orders (Ex. 2, ' 26), and paragraph 29 of the 
contract contemplated that Ranch Homes might engage in 
presale activities, including execution of purchase agree-
ments prior to the conveyance dates. 
The option was to be exercised by giving written notice 
to CPCC on or before 5:00 o'clock p.m. on April 1, 1975 (Ex. 
2, \! 11 2 and 3) . 
After the option agreement was entered into, it was 
neclc1Sooary fo.c Hilncl1 Jlorncs to perform a great deal of prepara-
lor', 'Jl:t:L lu c](\LC'rminc 1·.'hether it would be to the company's 
- 5 -
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--
advant.:i.gc to exercise the option and p.:i.y Lo GPCC the amour, 
approximately $500, 000 over tl1e next fout: yeat:s includinq 
$50,000 within one month after exercise of the option. 
Accordingly, the company's officers set about dcv12loping Uc 
plans. l\t thilt time the property, which hud recently been 
annexed by Park City, was unzoned, and the city Wils in the 
process of rcwri ting its entire zoning ordin.:i.nce (R 594). 
In order to achieve the zoning necessary to permit 
development of the property, Fahs, as president of Ran~ 
Homes, Inc. , met with the city's master plan conuni ttee to 
obtain approval of the cluster housing needed to develop 3.i 
units per acre, this density being necessary to make the R2r. 
Homes plan work. The plan of Ranch Homes was approved~~ 
City in early 1975 and sent to the planning comr,1ission. fir. 
approval by the city council WilS obtained in March or April 
1975 (R 594). 
It was also necessary for the company to obtain FHA 
approval of the project, which required preparation of final 
architectural drawings as a prerequisi tc to an Flll\ appraisal. 
The appraisal would pETmi t the company to place a value on 
the houses. In the spring of 197S, Ranch Homes succeeded i:i 
obtaining an "ASP-9" feasibility letter from FHA (R 595-5%). 
While this was going on, Fahs was also negotiating with 
1 d · · · t · t · 1·.'J0 t11 tl1c·1n rc.1·Je'~1·cdly to i:irrar•s: en ing insti·utions, mee ing . . u ... -
for financing of the subdivision (R S9G). 
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)(irnc h JJc;: 1<2s had to produce: plans and specifications for 
the l cck1·c1l Jluu.':inc; /1Utburity for the project generally, 
inclurlinc_i cl fJr,or plon, elevations, sections, and construction 
deti;il; tyf1L: o[ concrete; the soil bearing pressure; lumber, 
shingles, and so forth. Feasibility studies were needed for 
Par!: City, for the Federal Housing Authority, and for financ-
ing institutions (R 597). For FHA approval it was necessary 
to prepare a certified soil survey. Tuckett prepared plans 
for off-site improvements, including 30 sheets of drawings 
for road profiles, sewer, water, and curb and gutter. The 
cul-de-sac design required more engineering in order to 
obtain city approval (R 598). 
Ranch Ho1,1es was told by the lending institutions that the 
lenders vould need assurances that the road and utilities 
prori1iscd by GPCC would in fact be built (R 607, 608). Fahs 
requested the assurances from Wells (R 610), but was told that 
GPCC w~sn't going to build the road and utilities (R 611). 
The parties attempted to work something else out. Various 
meet i.lFJS 1·;crc hec>ld and various proposals were made by GPCC 
(R G12), but the assurances were never received. On April 1, 
19'/'J, prior to S:OO o'clock p.m., a letter exercising the 
opL~on ~a~ drlivered to GPCC and in accordance with the terms 
of the co1!~r;:1cl·_, closing of the transaction was set for 
Jip1il :;o, l'J'h zct. 10:00 o'clock a.m. (Ex. 1). Ranch Homes 
- 7 -
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officers 1·1erc sent by GPCC to Los l\n~ie:lc~; to tall; w1· tl·i Don 
Prell of Union lv1icrica, lr•c., the company lh:1t Has to 0 ,,.m 
Holiday Ranch ziftcr a rcorganizcction then in pro0rc:,s ()( GJ: 
Ru.nch Jlorncs never did receive any u.ssLir<tncc,s that the 
road'.·1ay u.nd uti litics wc•nld be built, but \·.'ere told by GPcc 
and by Don Pre 11 th0 t they woulc1 not be built. Accordingly, 
when tlw time fo:c closing the trcinsaction arrived on April:. 
1975, Ranch Homes relied upon GPCC' s rnanifccstation tho.t it"· 
not going to perform and did not attempt to close the trans-
action (R 615). 
In reliance on its contract 1·1i th GPCC, Ranch Homos 
spent $27,587, including $2,587.39 advanced by a related 
corporu.tion in which the Ranch Homes principals were involv' 
(R 599-603, Exhibits 5 and 6). In addition, the officers 
of Ranch Homes performed other valuable services for whict 
they expscted to be paid (R 627-677). There was testimony 
that the services performed by Fahs we:ce worth $17,500, 
over and above the compensation he had received from Ranct 
Homes (R 628), and that the value of the plans and specifi-
cations prepared by 'l'uckett, for VIhich he had not been paid, 
was $2G,OOO (R 676). 
The case 1-1as tried t11ice, once to a j u:ry and once to 
the co·u:ct. In the first trial the jury returned a verdict 
in L:ivor of pL·>ir1tiff fo:c $27, S87 out·-of-1_,,:Jc]:ct c/:[KnJi.tur2'' 
and $16,000 loc"t bu:~inccs:c: profit-.~_;, thE" courl: Jo.Jving refused 
8 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to sulJ1,:it to the: jury the question of the value of services 
performed by corporate officers (R 92). On appellant's 
mo'cion, the court g1-anted a new trial. At the beginning of 
the second trial, the court ruled that the value of the 
services of corporate officers were recoverable, but that 
anticipated profits were not. After the trial, the court 
found that Ranch Homes had spent the sum of $27,587, and 
U1rcugh its officers had performed services of a value of 
$15,000 in reasonable reliance on the contract. It entered 
judgment accordingly with interest and costs. 
Other facts relating specifically to the points raised 
by app2llant will be discussed in the arguments to which they 
are germ2ne. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
Plaintiff's expenditures were reasonable, were made in 
reliari_ce on the con.tract, and were foreseeable at the time 
the contract was made. 
We have no quarrel with the rule of foreseeability as 
it relates to the determination of damages for breach of 
con true\-.. The rule has been stated with minor variations 
sine,, :i.ts pronouncement in 1854 in the landmark case of 
\'ihccTc· t1.m p::rti.cs have mac1c a contract which one of 
i \1, m h.:t "' b•:CJ :": n, t 112 dcrnciqc s which the othECr party 
0 1Yjli1. lo i:, cc,ivc in rcspc~t of such breach of contract 
- 9 -
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should be; such <is. m;:y f«irlv c:11c1 n:c!SOrulily he• cow·. 
cJ ' L l ' ' j 1 l ' ' ->j ere; c1_-L 1cr l1-c1_:;J_I.\1 nLj~-u.1-,. -/, J .c., ucco1-(Jir: 9 tot~-~ 
':u:;uci_J ~cours<~ of th1-r:!Js, :(·r 0i11 ~_;11cJ1 brc·acli of contra::'~'" 
l.tscJ J.:, or ;:~ucJJ ~;:_, J.LJ:f. J-t:c~~·uj1(1 1 l] y L•('. S'J.PJ>n~·r cl to h::i 
!Jcen ·1n the conh~1"plc1tJc>11 of both p:1rtic1.o, «l. th(; t'. 
the.' F1,:c1~ th<_· cunt.rcict, a1: the JJYJ•J.uJ•lo l.'LS\llt of tfr. 
br~dch of it. I·;o\·;, if the s~)(_·cizl L cj_rcur~1 ;tl·,ncl-::S ur,c:.~ 
'dh1_c]1 i.h·.:; contr.=tct \\1as c1-::~lLilly r.:._dc \·,'ere~ · 
!Jy tlic pLJintiJ L; to Llie clcfcn,,!iinl·s, ;::,nd lhu~. knm·;n .0 both poi: tic'.,, the dci;-,,:,c;cs .C1':.:ull .t nci fro;•1 Ll1:: IJ:cc:uc!, ~: 
contJo.ct, which they 11Uulc1 contc111)late, v:OL•JCi be the· 
2mount of in:juJ·y 1.'hich 11ci.1ld orcJj11c:d Jy fol le•'•·' from a 
bre;:ch o.:: contract. unclcr these; spvcidl ci.ccun:c;td;;ces 
so Lno·.,:11 a.nu co:11r:;unicalcc3_. * * * 
The rule is ildo0tcd in sulJstilncc by Hestatcracnt of 
Contracts, § 330, which provides: 
In a1·:u:cC'.ing oarnac;es, compcns,,ti.on is given for only 
those injuries tlwt the defe?ndant had rea::;on to fores'. 
<is a prob<:'.blc result of his breach 1 ..1hee11 the coni:rcict 
was mack. If the injury is one that follows thee brGo:· 
in the usual cou,:se of ev<?nts, thc:rc is sufficie:it 
reason foi· tlK defcndc;.nt to foresc"'° it; othcn·1ise, it 
must be sh01m specificall.y that. the c12fcndant h2d 
reason to knuv1 the facts ancl to forc:escc" the injury. 
In P0.cific Coast Title In_:';u:rance Comp20y vs. Hc:rUord 
AccidPnt and Indc11inity Compciny, 7 Utah 2c1 377, 325 P.2dSOi, 
907 (1958), the rule is stated by this court ilS follows: 
The rule as to 11hat damucJes arc recoverablco for breach 
of contcict is biiscd upon the cuncc::pt of n::zisO'L:ible 
foresecabi lj ty th2t loss of such ncPC.2.::_~_c::.1_._il_r:ac-ter 
would result fru>i1 the-L:;"c-~icTi:·-·,1·1,c:J_-cfore, lo 11e cornp,,n-
sa!Jle, the loss rnu::;t rt>ccul t f:rorn the brcz;cli in the 
nattP:ol cind usc10.l cour~;c of C\'(?nt.s, so th0t it c0n 
fairly and rea1c;on~1bly bc.c: !Oiiic1 th t if the niJldS of tl:e 
parties h2d al!\·crlcd to lJ·" -.-;ell 1·.'hL' l the cor:i. 1 <1•:t 1"'d 5 
made, 1 os s of sucL charzictcr 1-;ould Ji_r.;o been 1:j thin 
thc2..r co11tr--.::•1pl0i~ion. [1~!.il_.Jh?lsjs ci(!c11..'cl] 
1 · 1 J c1o quarrel !11 tbou-,;11 1: . ..: cJo,1' c qu;1r.r:c .. 1n th t L' ru .. c, w·:' • 
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iii:c.i c;tcncc tl1:1 t the opinions of its experts were controlling, 
viitli the di ~.regard of contrary evidence, with the attempt to 
shift iti; bucclen of proof to the respondent, and with the 
treatmcnl of fact issues as if they were law issues. 
In its litany of expenditures that were not "foreseeable 
and reaso1wble," the aprellant has not considered the general 
ch;n,1ctcr of the losses l•'hich would likely result from its 
breach of contr.:ict, but only fragments of specific items of 
damage. It has also disregarded those portions of the 
testimony Bnd the terms of the contract from which the court 
could (and properly did) find foreseeability. 
The appellant has treated the contract in this case as 
if the only pertinent part was the title. But as pointed 
out in the statement of facts, the agreement was not only an 
option, it was a definitive contract relating to the develop-
mcnt of the 30 acres of property in Park City, and the 
entire col!tract, including the seven months lead time between 
granting of the option and the date for its exercise, shows 
knrn .. ·ledcie upon the appellant's part that Ranch Homes was 
going to proceed with its plan for the development of the 
proper t:y. 
B0forc the contract vas 0ntered into, Fahs and Robert 
Wells of CPCC hild discussed the plans for the property. Mr. 
Fahc.tr;;(jfi.~(1 (R592): 
cli 11::~·-cJ 1·'i_t.li nr. \'1clls the fact that we wanted to 
cJ.· :'. 1 i_-c·; _ld·- 11tic.l subCLivision in Park City that 
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would be primi">rily cornpo:-:c_:d of dpproxirn:11:cly 103 to 
lots to a 30-acrc piccr, oi pro:Jcr Ly. \'le discii::'·"d 
various loc.:11- i 011s us to v1hc'rcc 11e thougllL the br'~~ or,, 
was. \\le aJc,() C)'.prcs::cd to him that we folt th<tl tr,,,. 
was a trcmcncioti.s rv11:kci:. for an r:1n approved typi:: oI··. 
subd:1vis.1on vntl1 prc1vJ.r1:Lnq I'Hl\ J.nsw:cd lo.:rns in thJt 
comrnunJty and we thoncJhi: 1.'i:. »10uld be o. succc's:c: and 
bzisicc::lly our ncgoi:.icboL:; rcvolv,~d iU:oui-.cl thzt fort 
next five to six r•1cmU1s discuss.ing at va.dons tiPt~s r,_ 
what 11e 11ere pi::oposin<J, the f:act tlv1t he '"'i.l11tcd it to 
have some control ond oversee what our pl<rns were Jnd 
approve them prior ahead of time so that we were c~­
structing so1w?thing in the Holidoy Ri1nch that \.'8ulcJ t;, 
an asset to the Ranch as opposed to something that 
would be dcctrirn:c;n tal. 
The contract itself contcrnpla.ted planning. Ranch Her.' 
was to be permitted to enter th~ property befcre exercise;' 
the option and to make measurement. The property 1·1as to be 
utilized for development of approximately 105 singk famil; 
residential home sites and homes. Plans were to be submittc 
to GPCC. GPCC was to install or cause to be installed a 
roadway and utilities, and "on or before the closing date" 
it was to provide Ranch Homes a flow line elevation and the 
location of the eight-inch sewer line. It 1-;as to provide 
assurances as to completion of the roadway and utilities~ 
evidence sa.tisfactory to Ranch Homes' s construction lender 
prior to the closing date. And Ranch llumss lwd tl1c rigl1t 
to engage in pre sale activities, j ncluding the cx12cution c" 
purchase 2greements, prior to the time that any convcy~Ns 
were rnccde. 
In its "ten-point must not" anitimcnt bc9i.rn1i11g 0t pag: 
5 of its brj cf, tliG appellant cl1.:i.llcnc;ccs a numh(:J' of 
- 12 -
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items it believes were improperly allowed as damages. 
The first item refers to expenditures "incurred prior 
to execution of the Option Agreement." This seems to be tied 
tu the argwnent found on pages 9 and 10 of appellant's brief 
that Kesler was paid $2,500 for legal work that had included 
services rendered prior to the execution of the option 
agreement. But Kesler testified that the value of services 
performed after execution of the contract was $2,500, the 
amount received (R 689). There may also be some complaint 
that part of the $17,500 claimed for Fahs's managerial 
services involved time spent before the contract was entered 
into. If so, it may be presumed that the trial court took 
this into account. The respondent's evidence was that 
services performed by Fahs and Tuckett in reliance upon the 
contract were valued at $43,500, but this was reduced by the 
trial court to $15,000. 
The second item refers to expenditures incurred "prior 
to plaintiff's exercise of the option on April 1, 1975." 
Appellant's complaint about these expenditures is somewhat 
vague, and wc assume that the theory is that damages are not 
allowable for a period prior to exercise of the option 
because there was no contract. But as will be shown in 
Point II of the argument, relating to the measure of damages, 
reliance damages were properly awarded. 
Items 3 through 7 relate to specific expenditures of 
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Plaintiff in preparation of 1Jla11s 1 cl 1 anc eve oprncn t of thP. 
subdivision. The appellant a0:1i n makc's tlic• rnisL1ke of 
ignoring the fi1ct thot the clilm<HJC:S need only be of the 
"general character" fore:~:ceable bv the pcirties. T' 
2 nc spc-
ci f ic items \'!ere all within the gene'-:tl char01ctcr of 
that might of have been expecttcd, viz., expenses for prepar_. 
tion, planning, development, obtaining financing, and 
arranging sales, for the subdivision. 
The eighth item refers to "e2:pcnditures incurred in u, 
incorporation of plaintiff ai1cl in the drc:fting of a prior 
limited partnership agrce1t'1ent," which must be a restcttrn.cr.~ 
of Item No. l. The statement refers to sc•rvices of I:esler, 
but the respondent's evidence is tho.t these services were 
not included in the $2,500 paid to Kesler. 
The ninth item refers to e2:pendi tures incurred in the 
"drafting of final archi tecturul ancl engineering plans for 
all phases of development not1;ithstanding the fact th0.t o:.i~ 
Phase I was to be completed in 1975, and incurred before 
exercising the option, before receiving FHJ\ approval and 
before a constructio;1 loan was approved." In this connect:: 
Fahs testified that final architectural drawings had to ~ 
prepared in order for the I'HA 0ppraiser to place a value or. 
the homes, and that this 1-1as nccc.::ssary to obtain financing 
for construction of the subdivision (!\ 596). Al thouyh it 
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was the plan o{ Fzrnch Hornes to do the subdivision in three 
phases, it was necessary to do the engineering for the 
entire project in order "for everything to work'' (R 682). 
ThP tenth item refers to ''expenditures incurred for all 
of the z1Lovc items even though, as plaintiff finally testi-
ficd at the conclusion of the Second Trial, a purchaser 
c0t~lc1 hi'_':'c:;___E_ouqht il lot from plaintiff and built his own 
house urc:'!:l __ it _with out using plaintiff's plans!" This com-
plaint is based upon a single sentence of Fahs among a 
multitude of paragr0.phs, which referred to one of many 
proj cction s. The appellant sees more significance in it 
than is warranted by the testimony. Fahs testified that it 
was the company's plan to develop 32 lots, build a model 
complex in the cul-de-sac, with four or five model homes, 
and presell the homes from the models. On cross-examination 
appellant's counsel asked whether a buyer would be required 
to build a Ranch Home house or could buy a lot. The testi-
mony went like this: 
Q. I see. So then you would have been willing to 
just sell 32 lots and not build houses? 
A. Oh I think we -- we -- we had that as -- in the 
back of our minds --
Q. I SC'C'. 
A. (Continuing) -- but when we went into the project 
Q. ~nd this subdiv3sion is a part is it not -- the 
first 32 or a part of the one hundred four lot 
~;ub.Jivision are they not? 
- 15 -
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A. That's corrccl. 
·A: * -A 
MR. PIUNCE: I am really confused. I hav0 been D[>cr-
ating uncl<:r the asc·lll•t;>Uon ti'Y"OUC]h a ckjJo::;itirJn ~uid 
throucih i.i corn;)lctc trial thcL this gent lc11nn was 
to build Lhi i.-ty-t;;o ho.1;cs i,1 accorc1ancc• 'd.i. th tlw tJla•• 
and specific,1tio11r3 thdL he put out il11c1 no·,·; all of. a ... 
sudden he is going -~.o put out thi.rty-t.•:.'O lotr_; and let 
people buy the lots und I a1:i rciJ.lly a.stounc1ccJ. I mo,,, 
I am really acotow1clcd to hear that 1-.'<c.· a;_-c not ·--.. 
about selling hon;c~s crnnplctcC:: for fifty-fivL: tho~oJr.: 
c:ny more c:nc1 the Fl!!'. co1;c~:dn1c-,11t doC'sn' t n,1,ari L>i1; 
because we are not -- because this was Lac-;ccl on tliGs: 
plans and those spccificaticns and ve ilrc not tcilki!l-
about any particular plan of a house. I o.m ilbsolutel·. 
astounded. I would like to -- I would like -- · 
THE WITNESS: Sir, thats wrong. I didn't say that. 
* * * 
THE WITNESS: I said to you from the outset and I 
always -- my testimony has always been that in or~r~ 
make this p:coject work you have a land loan that i'Ou 
must record on the property and you mu."t clevC'lop thirr· 
two lots and we always had the intention of build 
model complex of five houses unc1 the rest of the house' 
on that devcloprn2nt would be built as they were ~re­
sold. It was a requj rement of the loan and in order 
to -- to be able to get that lund loc1n and in orclGr tc 
be able to develop even five spec houses and cul-de-so: 
for a model complex, it was 0ccessury to prcp8re 
architecturz,l plans 1·:llich v:ei_e processed through the 
FHA, received il vv.lu:::i.tion so that tho lcncl:::r knuv 1:hJt 
the value of that home was so he might loan on it a~ 
my testift'1ony has been that way. 
The testimony shm·:s that the appellant's concerns ar~ 
unwarranted, except to the extent tl1at losers' concernc: are 
always warranted. 
The itemiz2ction used by appcJ L,nt dc1 rn()n,-;trcitcs tho 
worth of this court's vic1: that only the qcncrnl chi'11,~cter 
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of the damages need have been foreseeable. And this view is 
supported by other authorities. In 5 Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 1012, we find the following: 
Just as reason to foresee does not mean actual fore-
sight, so also it is not required that the facts 
actually known to the defendant are enough to enable 
hi1:i to foresee that his breach will cause a specific 
injury uf a particular amount in money. If he knew 
that his breach would cause the shutdown of a mill, he 
had reason to know that his breach would prevent the 
sale of its product at market prices. It is not 
rGquirecl that he should be able to foresee just how 
many articles would be sold, or to what specific 
persons or at what exact prices they would be sold. 
What is required is merely that the injury actually 
suffered must be one of a kind that the defendant had 
reason to foresee and of an amount that is not beyond 
the bounds of reasonable prediction. 
The appellant seems to treat the question of foresee-
ability as if it were a question of law, rather than a 
question of fact which was decided against it. 
In Holt !lanufacturing Co. v. Thornton, 136 Cal. 232, 68 
p. 708 (1902), the appellant argued that the question of 
whether high winds that had led to increased losses were 
"within the contemplation of the parties" should not have 
been submitted to the jury but should have been determined 
by the court. The Supreme Court of California said: 
In McMahon v. Field, 7 Q.B. Div. 591 Brett, L.J. 
speaking of these three questions: "First, whether the 
dam~lgc is a necessary consequence of a breach; secondly, 
whether it is the probable consequence; and thirdly, 
whetl1cr j t was in the contemplation of the parties when 
the contract was made," -- said: "Those two last are 
rath<cr quL'Stions of fact for a jury, than of law for 
th~ court, to determine." The foregoing cases are in 
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accord 1.'.i th the wcic1l•c~ of authorj ty on the subJ·c···t 
- '-- , Cl~: 
express the princ.i plc that ,;J-.ould l.Jc cl].J~,} icd to the " 
particuldr fi.lcts of tile cz1sc ut bur. 
This view is supported by tlic other cases and bi• tc:-:t 
writers on damaycs and contracts. 
(Hornbook Series), p. 574, we find the fuJlrn-1.i.ng: 
If men could reasonc;bJy differ over the objccti\'c 
facts relative to the• givinci o[ notice, or over the 
question whether, on the fccts thus found, the dc.c-
faul te:c should, when the con tract was made, re<Json2bL 
have foreseen thL!t such a loss as this would I.Jc tho · 
result of breach, then these' qu<e:stion~c: of fact and tr.e 
inference arc to be submitted to the jury. 
There is agreement in 5 Corl.1 in on Contracts, § 1012: 
The question 1·1hethcr or not the ckfcndiint did in fact 
forecec, or had reason to fore: sec, the injur~' that the 
plaintiff has suffered is a question of fact for the 
jury, subject to the usual supervisory power of the 
court. * * * 
In support of its contention that the costs incurred bj' 
Ranch HomGs were unforesceablG and unreasonilble, appellant 
relies almost entirely upon (1) ipse dixit and (2) the 
testimony of Mr. Herbert Trayner, a subcli vider and general 
contractor who was presented to the court as 311 expert. T~ 
ipse dixi t we can meet 1·.'i th ipsC' c1i;:i t of our own, und the 
testimony of Trayner we can meet with the rccogni ti on thJt 
it is only an opinion. In Byram v. Payne, 58 Utah 53G, 201 
P. 401, 404 (1921), the defendant in an action for in:jury to 
sheep while aboard a con@on carrier contended that the 
testiinony of an expert as to the c0use of dC'<ith of tile shc'-i 
shou]d have been z:s conclusive. In affi.rr:t.illCJ a con1·,-,·1ry 
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judgment by the trial court, this court said: 
Possibly the jury failed to give to the testimony of 
these exl'ert witn,c";-;sc.:s the we_"ight to which it was 
entitled, but the weight of testimony, including that 
of expert witnesses, is wholly a subject for the 
jury's determination. Doubtless the defendant pre-
sented a strong defense, but it is evident from their 
verdict that the juro.cs believed the sheepmen and 
farmers ond doubted or rejected the testimony of the 
veter ino r Lrns and biologists. It is not within the 
province of an appellate court to pass upon the evi-
dence and say that the opinion of the jury was wrong. 
Accord, 31 Arn. J1_n: 2d, Expert and Opinion Bvidence, § 183. 
The trial court in our case heard the qualifications of 
appellant's expert and listened to his testimony. The court 
also listened to the testimony of Ranch Homes's witnesses, 
including persons who were trained in architecture, engi-
neering, and the development of subdivisions, and who had, 
in fact, been employed for a substantial period of time by 
the appellant itself. 
One difficulty with Mr. Trayner's testimony is that his 
experience was geographically remote. He had done work in 
Salt Lake County and in counties to the north and south, but 
had not done any development work in Park City. He was not 
familiar with the zoning ordinances there. He did not know 
what was necessary to accomplish a change in zoning there. 
His testimony as to what expenses were reasonable and what 
ones were not is entitled to little weight. 
Moreover, Trayncr's testimony supports the view that 
du111u9e:::; of the g·.~ncral character claimed by Ranch Homes were 
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foreseeable. He testified that the length of time for an 
option to run generally would be based on what had to be 
done in order to develop the property; that certain th~~ 
had to be worked out before a purchaser would know whether 
he would want to buy the property (R 887). After obtain~g 
the option and before C):ercisinCJ it it would be necessary 
for a builder to go through various steps. The first step 
is to arrange for the proper zoning (R 869), in connecti~ 
with which it would be necessary to show the ownership of 
the property, the density picture, the number of units per 
acre, whether the development will be residential, single-
family, multi-family, conunercial or whatever; preparation of 
a preliminary layout showing the configuration to which tle 
land is to be put; and work on obtaining a conuni trnent from a 
lender (R 874). He also testified that it was advantageous 
to have FHA approval. 
The things he was talking about in his testimony are 
the kinds of things that Ranch Homes did, and they are t~ 
kinds of things that were contemplated by the contract and 
by the negotiations that prececded it. On the basis of all 
of the evidence, the trial court properly found -- as a fact 
that the damages were foreseeable (R lGG). 
It is submitted that it was the duty of appellirnt to 
show that the costs incurred by Ranch Homes were not reJSO~ 
able. A landmark case dealing with the mcusure of cL1mages 
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for breach of contract is United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 
338, 4 s. Ct. 81, 28 L. Ed. 168 (1883), in which the United 
states Suprcm~ Court said: 
It does not lie, however, in the mouth of the party who 
has voluntarily and wrongfully put an end to the con-
tract, to say that the party injured has not been 
damayed at least to the amount of what he has been 
induced fairly and in good faith to lay out and expend 
(including his own service), after making allowance for 
the value of materials on hand; at least it does not 
lie in the mouth of the party in fault to say this 
unless he can show that the expenses of the party 
injured have been extravagant, and unnecessary for the 
purpose of carrying out the contract. 
The appellant attempted to show that the expenditures 
of Ranch Homes were extravagant and unreasonable, but it 
relied upon a witness who was unfamiliar with developments 
in Park City, and the court was not bound by his opinion. 
There are thousands of cases dealing with the foresee-
ability of damages resulting from breach of contract. Each 
of the cases is different, and each is decided, in large 
measure, by the wording of the contract and the special 
circumstances communicated to the defendant. Many of the 
cases cited by the appellant relate to consequential damages 
which were highly unusual in light of the nature of the 
contract entered into. Ours is not such a case. 
The expenses incurred by Ranch Homes are not "collateral," 
as argued by the appellant. The contract provided for the 
purchase and the development of the 30 acres of property 
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owned by GPCC, and Ranch Homes was obl iga Ler1 to use> the 
property for the develop1<.1ent of a subdivi~;ion of 103 to lo; 
houses, with plans and specifications to be J.Jresentc•d to ar, 
approved by GPCC. The things that were done by Rctnch Homes 
were all done in furtherance of that contract. 
That damages of the type sought by Ranch Home>s are 
recoverable is also shown by the cases cited in Point II of 
this brief, though the Points I and II are necessarily 
interrelated and should be considered together. 
II 
The proper measure of damages in this case consisted 
of expenditures made in performance of and in reliance upo:, 
the contract plus provable lost profits. 
A leading and often cited case dealing with the rneasur; 
of damages for breach of contract is United States v. Beh2n, 
supra, 110 U.S. 338, 4 S. Ct. 81, 28 L.Ed. 168 (1883), 
which involved a government contractor who had expended 
money and services in reliance upon a contract with the Unit' 
States. Before complete performance, the contract was 
terminated by the government, and in discussing the rneasuu 
of damages for the breach, the court said: 
The prima facie measure of damages for the breach of a 
contract i:s the 0.rnount of the loss whj ch the injured 
party has sustained thereby. If the brcuch co!lsists ill 
preventing the performance of the contrilct, wjthout t~ 
fault of the other party, who is wil lj ng to perfonn it, 
the loss of the latter will consjst of two distinct 
items or grounds of damage, nzirrtely: fir~;t, what he 
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has alrc~~y expended towards performance (less the 
value of materials on hand); secondly, the profits that 
he would realize by performing the whole contract. 
The court noted that it is not always possible to 
recover for loss of profits, because they may be too remote 
and speculative in character, but pointed out that the 
failure to prove profits will not prevent the party from 
recovering his losses for actual outlay in expenditures. 
The court added that the party who voluntarily and 
wrongfully puts an end to the contract and prevents the 
other party from performing it, is estopped from denying 
that the injured party has not been damaged to the extent of 
his actual loss and outlay fairly incurred. 
The relationship between the rule permitting recovery 
of out-of-pocket losses and recovery of anticipated profits 
is explained in 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1031: 
It is often very difficult to estimate the amount of 
profits that have been prevented by the breach of 
contract not only because of uncertainty in the happen-
ing of a various contingencies, but also because of 
difficulty in determining the money value of a promised 
performance or ';;he cost of completion by the plaintiff. 
There is usually little difficulty, however, in proving 
what has already been expended by the plaintiff prior 
to the date of breach by way of preparation and part 
performance. The fact that profits are to uncertain 
for recovery does not prevent a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff for the amount of his expenditures. 
* * * 
The present rule allowing the recovery of expenditures 
is not an alternative rule that may be applied only in 
the cases where profits are too uncertain for recovery. 
There arc very many cases in which judgment has been 
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given for both the profits and the amount of the 
expenditures. It is entirely proper to do this 
provided th~it sufficient care is toJ;cn to u.voill,giv' 
f inc a double recovery or the same clcmL:nt of horm. A ' 
judgment for profits, when that tccrm is pro;x'rly user' 
never in~ludes zmy of the plciinlitf' s coxpcndit.ures iii' 
preparation or part perforno.nce. The~ cost of full 
performance by the plaintiff always jncludcs these 
expenditures; and this. totu.l cost must be subtracted 
from the contru.ct price in order to clctcrrninc the 
amount denominated as profits. It follows that in 
addition to "profits" so computed the plu.intiff is 
always entitled to the amount of expenditures that 
would have been reimbursed by the pcrforrno.ncc promised 
by the defendant before any "profits" would bccgin. 
In § 1032, Professor Corbin adds: 
The rule in the preceding section must not be limit~ 
to expenditures in the forrn of pu.yments in money. If 
the injured party has, in the course of performance 0, 
in the preparation therefor, transferred or consumed 
property or has performed work and labor of value, 
these may be estimated and included along with his ~~ 
outgo. 
In Holt v. United Security Life Insur<:mce & Trust Co., 
76 N.J.L. 585, 72 A. 301 (1909), the plaintiff was award~ 
damages for expenses incurred in reliance upon an agreement 
by the defendant to make a loan. The loan was for the 
purpose of permitting the plaintiff to complete a purchase 
of real property, remove the house from the property, and 
construct a new building on the property. In reliance on 
the contract, the plaintiff sold the frame building that 
stood on the land and proceeded to make contracts with 
various parties for the furnishing of materials and doing o'. 
construction work on the new building. While the work was 
in progress, the defendant notified the pla:int:iff that it 
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was not going to make the loan. On the question of damages, 
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals said: 
Losses directly incurred, as well as gains prevented, 
may furnish a legitimate basis for compensation to the 
injured party. And, among such immediate losses, 
expenditures fairly incurred in preparation for per-
formance or in part performance of the agreement, where 
such expenditures are not otherwise reimbursed, form a 
proper subj0ct for consideration where the party injured, 
while relying upon his contract, makes such expendi-
tures in anticipation of the advantage that will come 
to him from completed performance. Where the profits 
that 11ould haveo been lost are shown with such certainty 
as to entitle the plaintiff to damages under this head, 
we do not mean to say that he may have recovery for his 
preliminary outlay in addition; for this would seem to 
involve a double recovery. But where one party repu-
diates and thus prevents the other from gaining the 
contemplated profit, it is not, we think, to be pre-
sumed in favor of the wrongdoer (in the absence of 
evidence) that complete performance of the agreement 
would not have resulted in at least reimbursing the 
injured party for his outlay fairly made in part perfor-
mance of it. 
There is no reason why the general contract rule allowing 
reliance damages should not apply to contracts or options 
for the sale of real property, and the rule has been so 
applied. 
Kamrncrt Bros. v. Tanque Verde Plaza Co., 102 Ariz. 301, 
420 P.2d 678 (1967), involved a contract for the sale of 
comn1ercially zoned real estate near Tucson, Arizona. The 
seller breached the contract and the buyer was awarded 
da1no.gcs for the breach. The court allowed both the benefit 
of the bargain and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in reli-
ance on the contract. The out-of-pocket expenses for which 
recovery was permitted included principal and interest paid 
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on the contract of sale, taxes paid on the land, archi-
tectural fees, topographical map, soil tests, attorney's 
fees, accountant's fees, and travel expenses. In addition, 
the court allowed damages for loss of bargain in the amoun+ 
of $l10, 000. 
In Mendoyoma, Inc. , v. County of Mendocino, 9 Cal .Zipp, 
3d 193, 87 Cal.Rptr. 740 (1970), the county, having acquirE: 
a right to use certain lands of the United States for parL 
and recreation purposes, entered into a written concessi~ 
agreement with Mendoyoma, giving the company the right to 
construct buildings and improvements for the service of the 
public and to operate them for a profit. The county breach' 
the agreement, and the court awarded reliance damages to ti;' 
company, which award was upheld on appeal. The trial court, 
however, had refused to award any amounts to Mendoyorna for 
the time spent by officers of the corporation in endeuvorinc 
to perform. On this point the District Court of Appeals 
reversed, indicating that the claim was not directed to MY 
compensation due the officers for their service, but rather 
to the compensation due the corporation acting through its 
officers. With respect to the denial of an av1ard of $14,2Ji. 
for interest which Mendoyma claimed becaus~ ~f a loan it 
took to finance the project, this was denied because the 
special circumstances surrounding tile formation of the 
contract showed that it was tile parties' understanding~~ 
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the project. \'las going to be financed by risk capital and not 
by a loan. It was not because the expenditure was "collateral" 
as suggested in appellant's brief, page 17. 
In Cain Shoes, Inc. v. Gunn, 194 Kan. 381, 399 P.2d 
831, 834 (196S), the parties had entered into a lease agree-
ment for property on which plaintiff planned a shoe store. 
The owner of the property failed to build the building in 
which the store was to be operated and the lessee sued for 
damages. The court said: 
In determining what might reasonably have been contem-
plated, the nature and purpose of the contract, and the 
~ttending circumstances known to the parties at the 
time the contract was executed, should be considered. 
* * * 
It is a well established rule in this state that expendi-
tures made in anticipation of, or in preparation for, 
the performance of a contract in which default is made 
or fulfillment prevented are recoverable (King Bros. v. 
Perfection Block Machine Co., 81 Kan. 809, 106 P. 
1071). 
It would appear quite probable that a party who leased 
space for a shoe store in a building to be constructed 
for occupancy on a particular date would order shoes in 
advance to be available at the opening date. It would 
also appear that shoes being seasonable, a s~rious loss 
would occur if the sales location was not made avail-
able. It would further appear probable that the inter-
ested parties would attempt to minimize the loss by 
finding a substitute location from which the shoes 
purchased in anticipation of the lease could be sold. 
These are matters which the trial court will give 
consideration under the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case when the new trial occurs. 
In Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948), 
action was brought for damages arising out of the failure to 
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give a dealer's franchise as promised. Applying cquitab~ 
estoppel, the court held that the triu.l court wu.s correct 
holding the dcfcndu.nts liable for monies that the promis~ 
had expended in preparing to do business under the promi~d 
dealer franchise, even thouc1h there was no cnforc,o 0lJle 
contract. 
See, also, Continental Plants Corp. v. Mc0sured 
Marketing Service, Inc. 274 Or. G21, 547 P.2d 13G8 (1976); 
Childress v. Cook, 2'15 F.2d 798 (5 Cir. 1957); and Brennerr" 
-
v. Auto-Teria, Inc., 260 Or. 513, 491 P.2d 992,995 (1971),• 
cases cited therein. 
Thus tile cases support the proposition that for bread. 
of contract, including those involving real property, the 
injured party may recover out-of-pocket costs as well as t~ 
benefit of his bargain. The out-of-pocket costs moreover, 
need not be in performance of the contract. As stated in 5 
Corbin on Contracts, § 1035: 
There are many expenditures made in reliance upon M 
existing contract that cannot be properly regarded as 
having been made in part performance of it, or even as 
in necessu.ry preparu. ti on for such performance. Such 
expenditures as these are not expected to be compen-
sated directly by the payment or other pcrformonce 
promised by the defendant, for they do not constitute' 
part of the agreed exchange. Nevertheless, the net 
loss involved in such expenditures may be included w 
the damages awarded, if at the time the contract was 
made the defendant had reason to foresee that such ,. 
expenditure would be made and that his 01-m brcilch l'iOUl 
prevent their reimbursement. 
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The c<1~jes dealing with breaches of contracts to sell 
real property, where the purposes of the purchase are not 
set out in the contract and are not shown to have been known 
to the vendor, have no bearing on the case presently before 
the court. Even those cases awarding only the difference 
between the value of the property at the time the purchaser 
was to have conveyance of it and the price he was then to 
pay, recognize that cases may arise where departure from 
this rule is permitted. In their brief, appellants recognize 
Neal v. Jefferson, 212 Mass. 517, 523, 99 N.E. 334, 41 
L.R.A.N.S. 387, as such a case, but attempt to distinguish 
it on the ground that it involved a lease instead of a 
purchase and that profits and reliance damages may be the 
natural and probable result of the breach of a lease agree-
ment. It is submitted that they may also be the natural 
result of the breach of a contract for the sale of real 
property, where the contract contemplates that the property 
is going to be developed, subdivided, and sold, particularly 
where the developer's plans were communicated to the defaulter. 
BunneJ v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (1962), 
docs not preclude the recovery of reliance damages. Although 
the court in that case mentioned that the measure of damages 
was the marl:ct value of the property at the time of the 
breach less the contract price to the vendee, there was no hint 
in the: case: lhat the out-of-pocket expenses were sought. 
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A different men sure of c10mz·1gc::; was uppliccl in the 
(1926). There the court indicated thal plaintiff could 
receive back what she' lwd paid, noting lhat she h«d not 
elected lo sue for p1:ofits or the value of the prop 12 rty. 
The Utah cases on damages for breaches of real esta~ 
contracts were discussed in the recent opinion of Srni th v. 
-~ 
\\Tarr, 564 P.2d 771 (Utah 1977), in which tlie triul court 
awarded the buyer's out-of-pocket loss but denied her 
benefit of the barguin dzunagcs, i.e. , the market valL:e of 
the property at the time of the breach less the zrnount of 
the unpaid purchase money. The issue was whether the b~e~ 
of the bargain could be award8d in the absence of a shm1inc 
of bad faith on the part of the vendor, the parties and f,, 
court having been in agreement that out-of-pocket losses 
were recoverable. The court noted that in those cases in 
which benefit of the bargain damages had not been awurded, 
the buyers had only sought out-of-pocket losses. l•?e have 
been unable to find any Utah case indicating thot out-of-
pocket losses cannot be recov8red in case of a contract for 
the sale of real property. 
On the basis of the foregoj ng, it is clear that the 
court applied the proper measure of clamJgcs or at least 
measure of damages that was not prejudicial to GPCC'. 
Homes took the position at the tri<1l, and takes j t nm1, tic 
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in addltion to out-of-pocket losses it should have been 
awarded the prof its it would have made in the d~velopment 
and sale of the real properties being purchased from GPCC. 
The point is made here primarily to emphasize the fact that 
GPCC has had the benefit of two trials and has had applied 
to the case a damage rule that is to its benefit, since the 
award of $16,000 loss of profits in the first trial was 
taken away from Lhe respondent in the second trial. 
The trial court's findings of reliance, reasonableness, 
and foreseeability were fully justified by the evidence. 
Under appellant's theory and the testimony of its appraiser, 
Ranch Homes wouldn't even be entitled to return of the 
$10,000 it gave for the option, and might owe something to 
GPCC for preventing it from performing such a disadvantageous 
contract. 
III 
The evidence does not support appellant's contention 
that Ra!ich Homes failed to mitigate its damaqes. 
Failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense 
as to which the appellant had the burden of proof. 
In this case, GPCC attempted to show that Ranch Homes's 
damages could have been mitigated, producing evidence that 
during negotiations following the repudiation of the contract 
by CPCC, certain other properties were offered to Ranch 
Homes at varying prices. The proof of GPCC in this regard 
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fails in several particulars. The most important of them ;c 
that nov:liere in the testimony is there any evidence its to 
how or to what extent the damages would have been mit;g t 
..1. a Et 
if Ranch Hornes had bought one of the parcels of property ori 
terms offered to it by appellant. 
The testimony of witnesses for Ronch Hornes was that U.o 
damages, i.e., the out-of-pocket expenses, were incurredh 
developing the plans and specifications, obtaining zoning, 
and preparing the material for presentation to the FHA and 
to financing institutions for development of the 105 lots~ 
the property under option. They also testified that ~e 
plans and specifications, architectural drawings, and engi-
neering drawings that were prepared by them, in fact all~ 
the work that was done by them had no value and could n~b 
used for any other piece of property. But the defendants 
have merely thrown toward the court the possibility of some 
other pieces of property being acquired at a better price, 
suggesting that, since this is true, the respondent did n~ 
mitigate its damages. But there was no evidence as to what 
could have been done with the property, what profits might 
have been made, or how the purchase of other property wou~d 
have aided the respondent in reducing the losses it had 
already suffered. 
Besides, the proposals made were not advant<lgeous ~ 
Ranch Homes. Fahs testified that the original alternati~ 
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thJl w~s proposed consisted of three 10-acre parcels com-
prising 30 ucrcs for the price of $10,000, and Ranch Homes 
made a counteroffer to purchase the property for $8,000. It 
was Falis' opjnion that thco 30-acre parccol was not worth 
$10,000 an acre, and that the work already done would not be 
useable on the substitute 30 acres (R 944). Other offers 
were made with respect to 56 acres, but after a meeting it 
was agreed urnong all of the parties that the proposal was 
not 11orkalJle, and that they ought to try to do something 
else (R 944). Development of the 56 acres would have re-
quired Ranch Homes to borrow money against the property and 
construct the utilities that had been planned to be con-
structed by GPCC, which would have cost $500,000 or so (R 947). 
This proposal fell through and the parties were never able 
to agree on it (R 944). As to another 58-acre parcel, the 
work previously done by Ranch Homes would have been of no 
use (R 947-948). 
In addition to the fact that the appellant has failed 
to show how Ranch Homes' damages would have been mitigated 
by any of the proposals that were discussed, there are 
certain rules relating to mitigation of damages which defeat 
this defense. 
The doctrine of mitigation as applied to contracts is 
more often rcf Prred to as the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quence-,;, a1H1 it is not as broad as appellant takes it to be. 
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As stated in 22 Jun Jur /'d, Dam:1_2_c:::_;~_].2: 
The? innocC'nt party is not r<:'quired to tziLc cxtraorct· . 
ff .' 1 tl J r l ln,,, e ·orts to avoJ.c 1c .. os~oes J:rom tie brccich of cont--.: 
nor is he expccLed to incur risl:s or spend substanti;; 
sums of rnone:i' to pro t cc t the def a ul tc J • Nor need h · 
sacrifice a suJ·1';tantii1l right of his 01111 in orclor te 
minimize ),j s loss. z,11 that is required of the non~ 
defaulting party -- in meilsurinq his damiiges -- is th--
he act reas,onably so as not unduly to enhance the '· 
damages caused by the breach. If the court determines 
that he has not actC'd reasonably to avoid damac;cs, the 
actual award of damages for the breach wi 11 be rC'duce' 
by the amount which could have reasonubly avoided. " 
It is also stated that "it is not necessary for th 8 
plaintiff to make another contract with the defendant w~ 
has repudiated, even though it offers terms that would 
result in avoiding loss." 5 Corbin on Contrarts § 1043, p, 
272. It was stated in Questo v. Dur ado, 136 Cal. App. 2d 
332, 288 P.2d 529, 531 (1955), that 
l'lhile it was the duty of defendzmt "to exercise reason-
able care to minimize anticipated damages growing out 
of the breach of a contract" * ~, * it was not for him 
to assume the burden of the wrongdoer nor to incur 
relatively large expenses on that account. 
In 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, § 37, it is said that 
Courts generally do not determine damages based upon 
the making of these expenditures unless (1) tht'y are 
small in corr.parision to the possible losses, and (2) i: 
is virtually certain that the risk incurred will avoid 
at least a part of the loss. Dam.:.iges will not be 
decreased through showing that ·a substantial expendi-
ture would hClve minimized the total loss or t.hat the 
suggested expenditure may or may not have decreased . 
damuges. 'fhe defaulter is in no position to cast th15 
risk of substantial expenditures on the plaintiff. 
Since such risks arose becuuc;e of the l.ll."cach, they are 
to be born by the defaulting party. 
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see, also, Double D Amusement Co. v. Hawkins, 20 Utah 2d 
395
1 
1]38 P.2d 811, 812 (1968); Theis v. duPont, Glore 
Forq_c~~_I_nc., 212 Kan. 301, 510 p.2d 1212, 1218 (1973); and 
Restatement of Contracts, § 336, Conunent a. 
The only evidence offered by appellant on mitigation of 
damages was that it would have sold some other parcels of 
property to Ranch Homes for substantial sums of money. This 
would have required Ranch Homes to enter into a new contract 
with the defaulting party, put up substantial sums of money, 
and enter into some kind of a development that differed 
materially from what it had planned. Moreover, the efforts 
that they had already made and which were uncompensated 
would not have been paid for by the development. The appellant 
having offered no evidence as to the profit respondent might 
have made by accepting one of its propositions, there is no 
basis for determining what amount, if any, might be deducted 
from the damages awarded to Ranch Homes. 
IV 
Interest was properly added to the damages awarded to 
Ranch Homes. 
In challenging the court's award of prejudgment interest, 
the appellant relies almost entirely on cases outside Utah. 
This is understandable, inasmuch as the law has been settled 
in Utah for 70 years that if the injury and consequent 
damage~ are complete, and the damages can be determined by a 
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fixed standard of value, rather than Ly tlw judcJment of tr, 
trier of fact, prejuuc)lnvnt intcrc:;t- is allrn.'<:iblc. Thi::; 
court has not been troubled by the "liquidctlc·cl-unliguidatc, 
dichotomy. 
Appellant is correct in stat ins that tlw Ltw of Utah 
with respect to jJrejudgrn:::nt interest was este<Llished in the 
early case of Fell v. Union Pacj fie R';. Co._ 32 Utah 101, 1 
P. 1003 (1907), but incorrect in its characterization of 
what Fell held. 
That case involved a claim for damages resulting fr~ 
the death of and injury to sheep shipped via the defendant 
railroad. The case contains an excellent discussion by 
Justice Frick as to the varying views on liquidated and 
unliquidated damages and the reason for allowing recovecy 
when the injury is complete. The court rejectc::d the vie1·: c' 
some courts that interest shouldn't run against a dcfcndar.: 
until he knows how much he should pay. 
that if the injury is complete, an auard of interest is 
necessary in order to fully compensate the injured party. 
The court said: 
* * * if a person's property is dcstroycc1 or damaged, 
why is he riot entitled to be com;-icnsatcd to the rull 
extent of its value in money f;o Lhat he in:1J rcpli1c8 tf<c 
same with other property of o like naturEl If on t~ 
day of its injury or destruction he ru;lorcs or r~plcc: 
it Hith his own money, why is he not c11titlod to interc 
on that money to the date of rcpoymcnt '? If he, hJcl 
loaned the rnr,n0y to 1-;omconc, ]1r: c<'1-ti:_i n-1 y 1-1uulcl lx 
entitled to intc:rc:_;t, crnd, j f he borro1_, .. -c1 -i l: from 
SO!l180ne, he v·oulu lib:ly ln'.'C' lo J>ilY i11l:c1,·rl !r·r its 
use. By bci11g i111il1c1rd lcq,Jl i11t•:1c1;t, ll1ut 1 u1c, licl 
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simply pl<.1ccd in stc1tu quo, aud nothing short of this 
is full cornuensation, and that is just what the law 
aims to accomplish. Is it an answer to say that the 
damages ar0 unliguidated, and therefore interest is not 
lo be allowed? This, to our minds, is no reason at all 
in Cilc.;c of injury to or destruction of property. In 
all :;uch cases the party sustaining the loss is limited 
in hj s rc•covery to the market or actual value of the 
property at the time of the injury or destruction. 
Moreover, he must establish the amount of the loss by 
some fixed rule or standard, and the evidence must be 
confined thereto, and either the court or jury must 
find the value in accordance with the evidence. In the 
class of cases, therefore, where the damage is complete, 
and the amount of the loss if fixed as of a particular 
time, there is -- there can be -- no reason why interest 
should be withheld merely because the damages are 
unliquidated. 
The court distinguished cases where damages are estab-
lishcd by some fixed rule or standard, from those in which 
the damages are determined by the judgment of the finder of 
fact, pointing out that in the latter type of cases the 
damages are incomplete up to the trial, and are "peculiarly 
within the province of the jury to assess at the time of the 
trial." Types of actions the court is talking about in this 
exception are personal injury, death by wrongful act, 
libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, 
assault and battery, and the like. 
In concluding its opinion, the court said: 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest 
should be allowed before judgment in a given case or 
not is, therefore, not whether the damages are un-
liquidatcd or otherwise, but whether the injury and 
consequent damages are complete and must be ascertained 
as of a particuiar tin~ and in accordance with fixed 
rules o I c'd de rice and knOl·m standards of value, which 
tl1c collrt or jury must follow when fixing the amount, 
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rather then be quidccl by tlie:ir best judqrnent in assr.·. 
the amount lo be itl lu· .. cc1 for p<1 ·; t as 1-.'r~ l l as for fu;
1 
•• 
injury, or for clc'InC'\ts th,•t cC111not be rnc•i1surccJ b·.· ;: 
fixed stu.nrJc;rd of Vitluc·. 'j'hc :;,,me ruJ1· unrJcr i.hn ... c. 
concli ti o.ri_'.:'._1 ·02:1 lcl oi _l_'!'!:.'.£2·' 1~C"~~~I·r~U_lo-i.;-(· ·~To~1s--for~ 
of controct. ' "' '' (crnph<1:c;is c1cic1c:cl) .----------.:.:... 
The rules laid down in Fe] l liavc nc;vcr 1.Jcen ovorrulcc 
or seriously chdllcngecl, <~nd havL' bc~cn folJ ov1c·d in mirncrk 
other cases decided by this court. 
In KirnbalJ. v. Salt Lci.l~~City, 32 Utah 2S3, 90 P. 395, 
397, (1907), interest was allowed on a claim for darnag 2s t: 
real property arising out of the change of grade of a 
street. 
In Jack B. Parson Construction Company v. StatP of 
Utah, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976), prejudgment interest 1-.•as 
allowed in connection with a construction contract, the 
contractor claiming what was essenLially an equitable adju'· 
ment in price, although the parties were poles apart witt 
respect to the amount due. 
In Wunderlich Contracting Company v. Unitea States 
ex rel. Reischel and Cottrell, 240 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 
1957), the Court of Appeols, opplying Utah law, approved tf<, 
award of prejudgment interest in a case thal was based upoc 
quantum meruit, or the reasonable value of labor and rno~n 
furnished by a subcontractor to a contractor. 
In Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. \1'hi.le SupPLi.or Co., 54G p,;: 
885, 887 (Utah 197G), a case in which prejuC:!C)nicnt interest 
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was al lov.'cd for dilmage to a compressor station, the court 
cites a nu~Jcr of other cases in which the Fell decision has 
been followed by the Utah court. 
We will make no atteu~t to distinguish the cases cited 
by appellant because those cases are representative of a 
philosophy of interest in which "liquidated" is the key 
word. They are not in harmony with the Utah philosophy of 
interest as it has been applied since Fell. This case comes 
within the rule established by Fell. The plaintiff's 
damages were computed on the basis of out-of-pocket expendi-
tures, shown by the books and records of the company; by 
the value of architectural drawings, engineering plans and 
specifications, established by testimony of experts; and by 
the value of services performed by Fahs as manager of the 
project, also established by testimony. These were not 
damages like those in personal injury or defamation cases 
where the damages are to be fixed in the judgment of the the 
trier fact. The damages were complete, and interest is 
necessary if Ranch Homes is to be fully compensated for the 
injury. 
Appellant also complains, but without citing any 
authority, that interest should not have been awarded 
because the plaintiff did not demand it, either in its 
complaint or at the trials. 
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But the comp] .:iint had Cl de11wncl for gc11eJ_cll n'lief (R: 
and it is usually held tllLlt i1 demitncJ for general reli(Cf 
empowers the court to grdnt whatever relief the facts 
pleaded and proved re~uire. 
Even if the complaint had cont<1ined no cJcr:1and for 
general relief, rcspondont has the bcmcfi t of Hu le 54 (c) (!), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
Except as to a party ac;ainst 1·1ilom a judgrnc,nt is ecen~erc: 
by default, every final judgment shall grant the r~1 1 , 
to which the party in whose favor it is n°nclered is -. 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadjngs. * * * 
The demand for j udgrnent is not part of the statement 
of the claim. There is no possibility that the appellant 
was misled by the failure to ask for interest in specific 
terms, because interest is allowable as a matter of law, a~i 
the factual presentation would not have varied a whit. 
v 
The Costs Allowed by the Trial Court were Proper. 
In its brief the appellant complains of (1) the all~~ 
to respondent of costs incurred in connection with the first 
trial; and (2) allowance of witness fees for attendance of 
Fahs, Tuckett, and Kesler, three officers of Ranch Homes. 
The verdict and judgment in favor of Ranch Homes in ti'' 
first trial was set aside by the trial court and a new trk 
granted. On the £",ccond trial judgrncnt was entered in favor 
f 1 · t'ff l · a11c-1' the court ,~J.lc>1·.'cc1 cos':s o pain l: Ranc1 Hornes agaJn, ~ 
to plaintiff for both the first ancl scconc1 u-i"l"'· 
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Fees to be paid witnesses are found in 21-5-8 Utah Code 
Mnotatcd 1953, and the section also provides that witness 
fees "may be taxed as costs against the losing party." 
Another provision relating to costs is found in Rule 
54(d) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Except when express provision therefor is made either 
in the statutes of this state or in these rules, costs 
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs; * * * 
Without citing any authority, the appellant claims that 
it was not the "losing party" and conversely, apparently, 
that respondent was not the "prevailing party" in the trial 
court. 
But the rule doesn't segment cases for purposes of 
costs. There is only one prevailing party -- "the one who 
in the end and on the entire case, no matter how diverse the 
issues or the nature of them, is entitled to judgment." 
Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 1 P. 2d 950, 953 (1931). 
In l!ughes v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 126 Wis. 
525, 106 ll.W. 526, 530 (1906), plaintiff had prevailed at 
the first trial, but a new trial was granted. He.then 
prevailed on the second trial but the judgment was reversed 
on appeal. After the third trial, in which plaintiff was 
again the prevailing party, the court refused to allow his 
costs in the first two trials. On appeal, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that costs for the fiist two trials 
shoulcl have bcc>C'll 01·10rdcd to plaintiff, saying: 
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* * *Section 2918, Rev. St. 1898, reguJating costs. 
broad and general and provides tllat "costs shall b ls 
allowed as of course to the plaintiff in an actione· 
the circuit court upon a recovery. * * *" This statln 
d .c. th f Ute clearly oes not co1u ine e cos ts o an action to a · 
single trial, bu~ covers the costs of the action and j, 
broad enough to include costs of former trials whc~ · 
the costs were not paid as a condition of the new 
trial. Such has been held to be the rule in other 
states under similar statutes. * * * The lower court 
therefore, erred in denying plaintiff's costs on the' 
first and second trials. [Citations omitted] 
This case was followed in Wendt v. Finch, 235 Wis. 22o, 
292 N.W. 890, 893 (1940). 
In Mills v. Southwest Builders, Inc., 70 N.M. 407, 37~ 
P.2d 289, 296 (1962), the first trial ended in a mistrial 
but the plaintiff prevailed on the second trial. The trial 
court, relying upon a rule of procedure substantially the 
same as our Rule 54 (d) , held that because the jury failed to 
return a .verdict the plaintiff was not the prevailing party 
in the first trial and the costs of that trial should not~ 
allowed. The New Mexico Supreme Court said: 
Section 21-1-1 (54) (d), NMSA 1953, quoted above, is 
controlling. What is included in "costs"? They are 
defined as "statutory allowance to a party for his 
expenses incurred in an action." [Citations omitted]~ 
find nothing in §21-1-1 (54) (d), or in the other section 
noted by the trial court limiting "costs" to expenses 
of trial, or of the last trial. If on the first trial 
a verdict had been reached, but on appeal there was a 
reversal and a new trial ordered which again result~ 
in a verdict, the party ultimately prevailing would be 
entitled to his proper expenses on the first trial, as 
well as on the second. Such is the prevailing rule. 
[Citations omitted] 
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other cases allowing costs for the first trial are 
Brunnabcnd v. Tibbles, 76 Mont. 288, 246 P. 536, 539 (1926), 
wherein plaintiff had prevailed at both trials, and Senior v. 
Anderson, 130 Cal. 290, 62 P. 563, 567 (1900). 
The appellant also contends that witness fees should 
not have been paid for the attendance of Fahs, Tuckett and 
Kesler, the officers of Ranch Hornes, relying upon Western 
Creamery Co. v. Malia, 89 Utah 422, 57 P.2d 743, 746 (1936). 
The reliance on Western Creamery is misplaced, however, 
because the case is against the appellant's position. There 
the losing party contended that fees for one of the witnesses 
should not have been allowed because he was an officer or 
employee of the corporation helping with the conduct of the 
trial. The court recognized that one who is in court 
"necessarily attending to the conduct of the suit" is not 
entitled to a witness fee but added, as is true in this 
case, that "there is nothing in this record that shows or 
tends to show that Monson was in court attending to the 
conduct of the trial." The only thing we have in this case 
is the appellant's naked statement to that effect in its 
brief. 
The fact that some of the witnesses did not testify on 
each of the days they attended the trial does not preclude 
the allowance of witness fees for them. In Burtenshaw v. 
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Bountiful Irr. Co., 90 Utah 196, 61 P.2d 312, 317 (1 936 ), 
the court said: 
~t is ~ettled in this state that the prevailing Parti, 
is ent1 tled to tax as costs the statutory per diem l 
witnesses subpoenaed in good faith and actually att 0'. 
the trial even though they may not have testified e:n:· 
day of attendance or at all. Ci: 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant had a fair trial, in fact two fair tria!' 
in which the jury and then the court found that Ranch Home:, 
Inc., had been substantially damaged by the appellant's 
breach of contract. 
The evidence shows that the damages awarded to Ranch 
Hornes were foreseeable in light of the negotiations of the 
parties and the specific terms of the contract. The evi~[ 
also justifies the finding of fact that the damages awardei 
were reasonable. They were not shown to be unreasonable. 
Both of these questions are fact questions, and both of 
them, on the basis of conflicting evidence, were decided 
against the appellant. 
A holding that the only measure of damages in a contn: 
in which there is an option to purchase real estate is the 
difference between the contract price and the market value 
at the time set for the conveyance would leave many part~ 
without a remedy. It is an unrealistic and illogical type 
of remedy in a case such as this where the parties were 
dealing with much more than a simple sale of real estate, 
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and were contemplating that the real property would be 
developed and sold as a residential subdivision. The cases 
support the view that expenditures made in reliance upon the 
contract should be allowed and, in addition, that where loss 
of profits is shown such profits should be allowed if they 
were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties --
which they were in this case. 
The defendant's arguments with respect to mitigation, 
... ; 
interest, and costs, appear to have been added to the brief 
solely for the purpose of giving it weight. The cases 
clearly establish that there was no failure on the part of 
the plaintiff to mitigate damages, and there is no evidence 
showing what the extent of mitigation might have been. 
Prejudgment interest is awardable in this state if the 
damages are complete and they can be fixed by some ascer-
tainable standard of value. And the costs of both trials 
for all of the witnesses called by the plaintiff were properly 
allowed. 
It's time this case came to an end. The appellant has 
had its days in court, a multitude of them, and the judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed with costs to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
...... Aoe 
Bryce E. Roe 
David E. Leta 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICJ\'rE OF MAILING 
_ju,0 (,ru ' 
A copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT Is BRIEF was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to F. S. Prince, Jr., Esq., Donald J. 
Winder, Esq., PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER, 455 South Thi~ 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for appellant, 
-,ptf tlf'kL 
on this ,_J ~ day of ·Har eh, 19 7 8. 
181 AUCE V. OiRISTENseN 
. /'- ... 
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